INDO PAK WARS-1947-71 A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS BY MAJOR A.H AMIN: INDO PAK WARS -1947-71-A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

Sunday, November 8, 2009

INDO PAK WARS -1947-71-A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!

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NOTICE TO POTENTIAL PLAGIARISERS IN QUETTA,ISLAMABAD AND RAWALPINDI

Indo Pak Wars-1947-71-A Strategic and Operational AnalysisbyMajor A.H Aminhttp://indopakmilitaryhistory.blogspot.com/Pakistani readers should not think of plagiary like command and staff college quetta's citadel publishing a plagiary of marine corps gazettes article of captain schmidt of 1988 in citadel 2/93 issue , as all these writings and maps of mine have beenpublished in Defence Journal etc.I wrote a letter pointing out this plagiary to the editor of citadel and the commandant in 1993 but no reply was received.

I hope that my friend Agha Masud Akram improves staff college as he is chief instructor i believe.A vain hope though in expecting one man to change a fallacious system which is a conspiracy against originality and boldness !All the maps also have been entirely conceived and drawn by myself Major Agha H Amin and I owe nothing to anything that I learn in any army institution.These are not maps like those in troop leading ion armoured corps plagiarsied shamelessly from US Army Field Manuals.

A GREAT TANK BATTLE CHAMB 1971

HOW KASHMIR WAS LOST IN 1947-48

Pakistans Charge of Light Brigade-Bara Pind

Demons of December - Road from East Pakistan

CONCLUSION ON PAKISTAN ARMY

HOW LAHORE WAS SAVED AND PAKISTANS ARMOURED DIVISION MISERABLY FAILED

Tank Ambush at Kushtia

The Western Theatre in 1971

BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

Kargil Conflict & Pakistan Air Force

Kargil-A Military Analysis-A.H Amin-May 2003

Why Indo-Pak Armies Failed in War-A.H Amin

Stray Reflections on Commencement of Writing 'Pakistan Army Since 1965

An examination of the strategic concept of the 1971

The Western Theatre in 1971

The Anatomy of Indo-Pak Wars

Indo-Pak Wars-A Strategic Summing Up

GRAND SLAM

Kargil Conflict & Pakistan Air Force

Book Review-Crossed Swords ,

Pakistan,Its Army, A HISTORYOF THE PAKISTAN ARMY-BRIAN CLOUGHLEY

LACK OF INTELLECTUAL HONESTY IN PAKISTAN

I WROTE PAKISTAN ARMY TILL 1965 IN 1999.BELOW IS THE SHORT ONE PAGE CONCLUSION CHAPTER:--

http://indopakmilitaryhistory.blogspot.com/2008/11/conclusion-on-pakistan-army-performance.html

THIS IS A SUMMING UP OF PAKISTAN ARMYS MILITARY PERFORMANCE BASED ON 24 YEARS OF MY RESEARCH CONCLUSION OF PAKISTAN ARMY TILL 1965THE COMMANDANT OF THE COMMAND AND STAFF COLEGE QUETTA,PAKISTAN DID NOT HAVE THE INTELLECTUAL HONESTY TO ACCEPT THIS BOOK FOR THE LIBRARY ( CORRESPONDENCE AND MY ORIGINAL LETTER IN THE BLOG DIVERSITY AND DISSENT).TO READ THE LETTER CLICK THE LINK BELOW:--

http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/2008/09/letter-to-commandant-staff-college.html

THE COMMANDANT ALSO DID NOT HAVE THE COURTSEY TO RETURN THE BOOK WHICH WAS SENT FOR THE LIBRARY AS A DONATION AND FOR WHICH THE STAFF COLLEGE HAD NOT PAID. SEE LETTER FROM STAFF COLLEGE REFUSING TO RETURN THE BOOK FOR WHICH THEY HAD NOT PAID BY CLICKING THE LINK BELOW:--

http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/2008/09/pakistan-army-till-1965-not-accepted-by.html

THE BOOK IS HELD IN US ARMY COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE LIBRARY,LIBRARY OF US ARMY WAR COLLEGE,FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY LIBRARY RUSSIA,LIBRARY OF CONGRESS USA AND AIR WAR COLLEGE LIBRARY AIR WAR COLLEGE KARACHI.JUST COMPARE THIS PETTY INTELLECTUAL PARSIMONY AND BIGOTEDNESS WITH THE GENEROUS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF A BOOK OF MINE " THE ESSENTIAL CLAUSEWITZ " THAT I DONATED TO US ARMY MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT.REPLY OF COMMANDANT WEST POINT BRIGADIER GENERAL MC FARREN IS AS BELOW(CLICK ON LINK):--

http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/2008/07/letter-from-commandant-west-point.html

BRIGADIER TAJAMMUL HUSSAIN MALIKS EPIC STAND AT HILLI-HE WAS NOT A CHEAP SYCOPHANT LIKE ZIA

The main objective of the Indian Army was to control Bogra, thereby cutting off Pakistan forces in the north from the rest of East Pakistan. The best way of getting to Bogra was through Hilli. The frontal assault on the Pakistan fortifications took a huge toll on both sides - the Indian Army suffering the greater number of casualties - before Indian forces finally broke through by establishing a block in the read of Pakistani forces in Hilli, upon which the 4FF Battalion in Hilli was withdrew for the defence of Bogra.

The Indian side consisted of the 20 Indian Mountain Division led by Maj-Gen. Lachhman Singh. The constituent units of this division were 66 Brigade, 165 Brigade, 202 Brigade and 340 Brigade (all infantry units), 3 Armoured Brigade, 471 Engineer Brigade and two artillery brigades augmented by 33 Corps Artillery. The ground troops were aided by aerial support provided by the Indian Air Force which had acquired air superiority in the east and were armed with rockets, guns and 100 lb bombs.

On the Pakistan side, the Area of Responsibility (AOR) was on 205 Brigade of Pakistan Army led by Brigadier(later retired as Major General) Tajammul Hussain Malik. He had joined the brigade 4 days ago, when he volunteered to leave GHQ, Rawalpindi and command troops in the East Pakistan. He put up a stiff resistance that earned praise from many quarters.

He had placed screens along the railway line nearby and at the Railway Station complex in the area. The defensive positions were sited in depth to cover all routes leading into East Pakistan. They fought the entire Indian division and the Mukti Bahini soldiers till the Indians decided to bypass Hilli and establish a block in its rear.

Brig. Malik then withdrew the forces in Hilli to avoid being cut off and to defend for the Bogra itself. Bogra was surrounded from all sides by the greater numbers of the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini. Brig. Malik's resistance continued even after the Pakistani Eastern Command surrendered in Dacca on 16 December. He, in his staff car with flags and stars uncovered went around the streets of Bogra motivating his soldiers to keep fighting. The Indian army had by then, surrounded the city of Bogra. The Brigade Major along with some 50 ORs surrendered but the Brigadier still full of vigour refused to give up.

Brig. Malik ordered the rest of his brigade to break out in small groups to Naogong, where one of his units was still fighting on. However en-route, his jeep was ambused, severely injuring him and his orderly. Muktis captured both of them and subjected them to torture. They broke his arms and split his head after which he was taken semi-conscious to an Indian army hospital. Major

General Nazar Hussain Shah, was especially flown in from Natore for the surrender of this brigade on 18 December 1971, due to the refusal of Brigadier Malik. Upon return from captivity, he was the only brigadier out of 32 or so who fought the 1971 War in East Pakistan to have been promoted to Major General rank.

The battle was a significant one as it involved great personal valour on both sides. This is highlighted by the fact that soldiers on either side won their nation's highest military honours. This battle was also unique in that it had started before the official start of the India Pakistan war but continued right until the formal surrender of Pakistan. Unlike other battles in the East where the Indian army dominated, Pakistan forces gave a very good account of themselves before the combined might of the Indian military managed to occupy the area.

The Indians were so impressed by General Tajammul Hussain Malik’s fighting tactics that after the war the Indians had sent a team of experts to study the battle on the ground and determine reasons why such a heavy force as described above could not break through that sector till the end.

Lance Naik Albert Ekka, 14 Guards of the Indian Army, who fought in this battle, received the only Param Vir Chakra to be awarded in the Eastern Sector during the 1971 War.

Major Muhammad Akram Shaheed of Pakistan won the Nishan-E-Haider, the highest military honour of the country.

A PAKISTANI MAJOR GENERAL WHO WAS ZIAS CONTEMPORARY ON GENERAL ZIA

A.H AMIN'S QUESTION:--

What were your impressions about Zia as you saw him in the Army tenure?

MAJOR GENERAL TAJAMMULS ANSWER (AND I AGREE WITH HIM 100 %)

I had not intimately known him before he became the Chief of the Army Staff but from his conduct during the Divisional Commanders Conferences, he appeared to me an incompetent and low grade officer.

In one of the Division Commanders promotion conferences, I even saw him sleeping with his mouth open.

He surpassed all limits of sycophancy when meeting the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he used to bow when shaking hands with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

I remember my old Brigade Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with whom I served as his Brigade Major, once told me that he had written in Major Zia ul Haq’s ACR when he served under his command, “Not fit to go beyond the rank of a Major”. It is an irony of fate that a person of such a calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long period of eleven years till he was finally killed in an air crash.

LINK FOR THE ABOVE QUOTE:--

INTERVIEW OF MAJOR GENERAL TAJAMMUL HUSSAIN MALIK:--

http://pakistan-army-interviews.blogspot.com/2008/11/maj-gen-retd-tajammal-hussain-malik.html

Sunday, November 8, 2009